Abstract: In the field of African philosophy, there exists the belief among the modernists or professional philosophers that gerontocracy is coterminous with authoritarian traditions in traditional Africa which, supposedly, are responsible for the lack of sustained curiosity to look at issues from different perspectives. Drawing from the Ifá literary corpus as a store-house for Yorùbá philosophy, I argue in this paper that gerontocracy in Africa does not construe the idea that the elderly in Africa are rigid in thoughts or have immutable authority which discourages independence of thought. I conclude that the position of the modernists on the supposed manifestation of authoritarianism in Africa derives its continuing force from a conception of philosophy which gives special overtones to the ideas of individuals as opposed to a collectivistic system of thought and the assumption that the multitude cannot produce philosophy.
According to George Sefa Dei, gerontocracy is "the traditional African respect for the authority of elderly persons for their wisdom, knowledge of community affairs, and 'closeness' to the ancestors" (Dei 1994, 13) . Sefa Dei adds that there is in Africa a general belief that "old age comes with wisdom and an understanding of the world" (ibid.). A. B. C. Ocholla-Ayayo (1976, 42) , using his people (the Luo) as a point of reference, is also of the view that old age is the basis of wisdom. Like the Luo and other ethno-linguistic units in Africa, the Yorùbá 3 also place a premium on old age and this reflects in a Yorùbá proverb which reads Àgbà kìí wà lọja kórí ọmọ tuntun wọ [An elder cannot be present in the market and let the head of a young baby (on its mother's back) twist to one side] (Delano 1979, 38) . According to I. O. Delano, this proverb suggests that elders, due to their age and experience, are expected "in all situations to make sure that misunderstandings which may lead to unpleasantness are explained and removed" (ibid., 39). The import of this proverb is corroborated further by Àtàrí Àjànàkú in the following thought-provoking lines: Ajaǹakú's lines accentuate the fact that "there is in general among traditional African communities an emphasis on age as a necessary condition for knowledge and wisdom" (Kaphagawani and Malherbe 1998, 212) . We must reinstate here that this emphasis on age in traditional Africa is perhaps one of the major issues that continue to intensify the debate between the modernists and the traditionalists in African philosophy. The traditionalists, let us recall, presented as philosophy African traditional worldviews which were predominantly oral and, by extension, "produced forms of literature which are not conventional in presentday Western culture" (Hallen 2002, 11) . The traditionalists, to the consternation of the modernists, maintained also that such worldviews are mostly appreciated as philosophical when examined through the eyes of the elderly or aged in Africa. On their part, the modernists felt that the traditionalists overlooked a conception of philosophy as a critical and systematic enterprise which, by this latter standard, means that "real" philosophy cannot be left in the hands of the aged alone as the traditionalist project seems to suggest. According to the modernists, an emphasis on age "denies epistemological authority to the young and able" (Kaphagawani and Malherbe 1998, 212) . This modernist stance therefore brings to mind the general assumption in the industrialized West where the elderly are considered as a burden to society and old age is perceived as that which brings about an inevitable decline in intelligence.
The belief among the Yorubá that old age comes with wisdom (and not an inevitable decline in intelligence) captures the traditional African approaches to an understanding of the world. But this emphasis on old age, according to Kwasi Wiredu, is unfortunate and increasingly exacerbates the "authoritarian odour" that permeates African cultures. Wiredu therefore comments that:
Our social arrangements are shot through and through with the principle of unquestioning obedience to our superiors, which often meant elders. Hardly any premium was placed on curiosity in those of tender age, or independence of thought in those of more considerable years (Wiredu 1980, 4). In the above excerpt, Wiredu seems to speak in the same tone as Paulin Hountondji who enjoins us to engage in "revolutionary iconoclasm, a 'destruction of traditional idols' which will enable us to 'welcome and assimilate the spirit of Europe'" (Hountondji 1983, 172) . By 'traditional idols' Wiredu and Hountondji would mean the elders who are the major representatives of ethno-philosophy and sage philosophy and who, in print, are represented by Marcel Griaule's Ogotemmeli (Griaule 1965) and Barry Hallen and J. O. Sodipo's Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft (1986) . Griaule's conversation with Ogotemmeli of the Dogon people of southern Mali reveals that the African "displays a great philosophic capacity in his exposition of the secret doctrines of his group" (Bodunrin 1981, 162) . On their part, Hallen and Sodipo identified certain Yorubá Onıśeguǹ (herbalists or "native doctors") who were versed in traditional Yorubá thought and, after carrying out a dialogue with these men, argue that the Yorubá system of thought is reflective (Hallen and Sodipo 1986, 62) . However, Hountondji believes that philosophy is essentially "a pluralistic discourse, in which different interlocutors question one another within a generation or from one generation to another" (Hountondji 1983, 83) . For Hountondji, ethno-philosophy overplays the collective communal outlook and therefore "aspires to confer a wisdom that is eternal, intangible, a closed system sprung from the depths of time and admitting of no discussion" (ibid., 84). The centerpiece of Hountondji's expostulation seems to suggest that philosophy is essentially a peculiar form of theoretical practice with no affiliation to wisdom. In the light of this, it will be hugely rewarding to examine the term "wisdom" and its age-long affiliation with the enterprise of philosophy.
There is the belief among scholars that wisdom "paved the way for philosophical and ultimately also for scientific thinking" (Rudolph 1995, 393) . As an ideal, wisdom is believed to be "the highest knowledge men were capable of and the most desirable patterns of human behaviour" (Curnow 2000, 10) . Accordingly, it has been described as an "anthropological ability to cope with life …; a rational system (interpretation of the cosmos, philosophy, beginnings of science); and a personification, hypostasis, goddess, or attribute of God" (Rudolph 1995, 394 ).
Plato's early dialogues, for instance, show that, for Socrates, wisdom provides its possessor with infallible judgment in his pursuit of a good life. Wisdom thus requires the possession of knowledge which in turn "provides the basis for infallibly good judgment in decisions pertinent to how one should live" (ibid.). Plato reflects this latter view in his later works. Due to sceptical attacks and the seeming triumph of Christianity in the medieval period, philosophical thinking began to lose its claim on wisdom as its defining characteristic. More specifically, wisdom began to lose its place of primacy within philosophical discourse after Aristotle. Thus:
The sceptics rarely discussed wisdom. They appear to have accepted something like the Aristotelian account of theoretical wisdom, but then cast doubt on our ability to grasp first principles by arguing that even the most rudimentary and particular forms of knowledge-such as grasping some particular fact-are problematical. Sceptical practical wisdom, such as it was, became something like the ability to withhold assent from any particular proposition, thus avoiding dogmatism and achieving quietude (ataraxia). The connection with knowledge was thus either broken (for practical wisdom) or required a vast and difficult defence of knowledge (for theoretical wisdom) before philosophy could even return to wisdom as a subject of study (ibid.).
On their part, the Church Fathers of the medieval period were chary of giving approbation to the distinction made by Aristotle between the practical wisdom of everyday life (phronēsis) and speculative or theoretical wisdom (sophia) which deals with "first things". Aristotle understands by sophia the highest intellectual, and especially philosophical, excellence of which the human mind is capable. The Church Fathers saw the distinction as marking the transition to theoretical (systematic) wisdom or philosophy, which they regarded as "useless and deceitful book-learning and arrogant intellectual presumption" (ibid.). By the close of the medieval period, therefore, the Church Fathers had almost succeeded in their ploy to vitiate or suppress the claim by the early Greeks that sophia is the highest intellectual excellence. The Church Fathers felt that, at best, theoretical wisdom or philosophy should subserve the Christian faith. From this standpoint, one can understand why wisdom was rarely mentioned in the early modern period.
From the early modern period onward, wisdom was not given its right place in philosophical thinking and philosophers were now fascinated by the rise of modern science. During the enlightenment, for instance, there was a complete disregard for wisdom as a defining characteristic of philosophy and, expectedly, this led to an overestimation of technical proficiency which accommodated a methodological agenda called "knowledgeinquiry". In other words, philosophers began a desperate search for the criteria of human knowledge and, as such, the conceptions of the good life became unclear as there were notable epistemological disputes within philosophical contexts. Therefore, the need for philosophy to return to the study of wisdom as an object of rational pursuit made Nicholas Maxwell (1984) contrast "philosophy of wisdom" with "academic philosophy" or "philosophy of knowledge". "Philosophy of wisdom" advocates the ideal of wisdom and the primitive definition of sophia (wisdom) as either skill in handicraft or general knowledge of or expert acquaintance with a thing, while "academic philosophy" distances itself from how the term "philosophy" was conceived during its inauguration in the tradition of ancient thought by laying much emphasis on technical proficiency. Considering that, traditionally, philosophy means "the love of wisdom", Maxwell argues that "all of inquiry needs to give intellectual priority to the growth of wisdom" and therefore "all inquiry needs to develop, and be an institutionalization of, what Socrates did, advocated, lived and died for" (Maxwell 1984, 148) . Since every culture has or has had its ideal of wisdom, it then follows that we can define philosophy as:
sayings, beliefs or assemblage or processes of the thoughts of wisdom which form a perceptible interconnected tradition; in other words, a general view of things, events and nature of the universe; or a set of generally accepted beliefs which give meanings or answers to events, problems, phenomena involved in the whole of life, or nature, as a whole (Akintola 1999, xii) .
Like Hountondji, Wiredu further shows his derision of unquestioning obedience to elders by comparing African and Western attitudes to their ontologies. According to Wiredu, "the Western philosopher tries to argue for his thesis, clarifying his meaning and answering objections, known or anticipated; whereas the transmitter of folk conceptions merely says: 'This is what our ancestors said'" (Wiredu 1984, 157) . The views of both Wiredu and Hountondji could be distilled as an attempt to bring to the public glare the authoritarian nature of African gerontocratic society which, in their understanding, stifles youthful initiative. The two philosophers are no doubt in agreement with P. T. Bauer who contends that the authoritarian traditions in traditional Africa were responsible for "lack of sustained curiosity, experimentation and interest in change…" (Bauer 1976, 78) . More importantly, Wiredu and Hountondji are of the view that African communal life does not agree with one of the important features of the universalist notion of philosophy, namely, that philosophy involves the ideas of individuals as opposed to collectivistic system of thought; this, in their view, distances Africa from the universal problematic of philosophy and is equally responsible for what Hountondji (1983, 67) calls "collective cultural exhibitionism."
Ifá on polysemy of discourse among the Yorùbá
Speaking from the Yorùbá point of view, there are "instances of …de-emphasis of the cult of the individual" (Owoyemola 1987, 86) which, as a matter of fact, does not suggest that the Yorùbá do not believe in individual excellence as Hountondji and his company would make us believe. In other words, the regard the Yorùbá give the elders in communal matters does not mean that the elders have immutable authority which discourages originality and independence of thought. Oyekan Owomoyela sheds more light on this, while stressing the fact that exclusive claim and proprietorship to an object is alien to Yorùbá sensibilities.
4 In Owomoyela's view, the fact that Africans honour their heroes to the point of worshipping them (as deified ancestors, for instance) is a pointer to their belief in individualism or individual excellence. He explains more copiously that:
Any society that encourages heroism and worships it, as Africans certainly do, evidently encourages individual excellence. Traditionally, nevertheless, the individual composer of a song would not think of copyrighting or attaching his or her name to it, nor would the carver carve his name on his product. Whatever smacks of assertive possessiveness, even over one's undisputed possessions, run counter to the traditional spirit. One finds the expressions of the underlying principles of cooperation, communalism and self-effacement in such Yorùbá sayings as Àdáse ní hunni; àjọse kì í hunni (Doing it alone brings disaster; cooperating never brings disaster); Kò mú tọwọọ rẹ wá kò gba tọwọ ẹni (A person who does not contribute what he/she has has no claim to what one has); Ẹnìkan kì í jẹ àwa dé (No single person may say "here we are"); and Asiwèrè èèyàn ní nśọ pé irú òun kò sí; irú rẹ ẹ pọ o ju ẹgbàágbèje lọ (Only an idiot claims that there is no one like himself/herself; the world is full of people like him/her) (Owomoyela 1987, 86) .
Thus, the Yorùbá (African) idea of gerontocracy does not construe the idea that the elderly in Africa are rigid in thoughts or encourage younger ones to nurse the opinion that the elderly "tend to be grouchy, despondent, childish, and passive" (Butler and Fillit 2003, 701 The Yorùbá god of wisdom is mostly called by either of two names, Ifá and Ọrunmila, both of which are the centre of controversy. A number of writers hold the mistaken view that the name 'Ọrunmila' refers to the deity himself while the name 'Ifá' only to his divination system (Abimbola 1976, 3) .
William Bascom and Wande Abimbola share the same view on the meaning of Ifá. In one of his published works, for instance, Bascom maintains that "Ifá is used to mean both the system of divination and the deity who controls it; and that this deity is also known as Ọrunmila" (Bascom 1939, 43) .
Among the practising babaláwo (Ifá priests or diviners) who are the custodians of the received instructions from Ọrunmila, however, the general opinion is that Ifá and Ọrunmila can be used interchangeably to refer to the Yorubá deity of wisdom. This stance is also supported by the frequent use of these terms by native Yorubá speakers. Besides, there is in the Ifá literary corpus itself textual evidence in support of the view shared by Bascom and Abimbola; in virtually all the verses of the 16 major Odù, Ifá is repeatedly used to refer to Ọrunmila and vice-versa, finally bringing an end to the perceived controversy.
In the Ifá oral text or literary corpus, there are 16 basic and 256 derivative figures which are divided into two parts, namely, the major categories known as Ojú Odù which are 16 in number and the minor categories known as Ọmọ Odù or Àmúlù Odù which are 240. The Odù are "obtained either by the manipulation of sixteen palm nuts (ikin) or by the toss of a chain (ọpẹlẹ) of eight half seed shells" (Bascom 1969, 3) . We should also add that there are symbols or signs, usually double vertical markings, used to indicate each of the verses of Ifá and their respective scriptural teachings. Interestingly, the totality of these markings depicts "all the possible combinations of the sixteen principal or senior apostles and the two hundred and forty secondtier apostles (the amulu-odus)" (Akintola 1999, 14) . It is desirable in any serious study of Ifá that such terms as odù and babaláwo are clarified or given adequate attention. The importance of these terms cannot be trivialized because of the interpretive meaning they give to the study.
According to Bascom, the meanings of the Odù are not easily explained by native Yorùbá speakers, not even by diviners after a long period of training and ordination. Bascom observes that some people have, however, endeavoured to explain the meanings of the Odù by attaching them to names which are tonally distinct from the names of the figure and deriving them from puns which "are not to be taken seriously as etymologies" (ibid., 43). The important thing to note is that the Odù is widely held to be the core of the Ifá corpus. Emmanuel Eze states more explicitly that:
Odu is a collection of thousands of aphorisms, poems, and riddles passed on from generation to generation of babalawos…Odu, however, is not a dead document merely repeated from one generation to the next. It contains elaborate exegesis on the text, but more importantly, it contains… theories about how to do the work of interpretation (Eze 1998, 174) .
Drawing from a myth on the origin of Ifá, Sophie Oluwole suggests that the 256 Odù̀ can rightly be regarded as certain Yorubá philosophers and intellectuals who flourished in the past. She also attempts to show that the works of these ancient philosophers have peculiarities and traits found in the works of certain Western philosophers. According to her:
Some Ifá verses are tense and harsh, while others are soft and more humane. Some verses in one Odù contradict verses in others. If we were to compare the mathematical rigour of Pythagoras' works with the humanistic concerns of Socrates, we will come up with some distinctions similar to the ones drawn here (Oluwole 1996, 13) .
Following Oluwole, therefore, we propose that the Ifá corpus is an encyclopedia, "the works of several individual thinkers within the same intellectual tradition" (ibid.).
The interpreter of the oracular message in the Ifá system is called the babaláwo. The Yorùbá revere the babaláwo (literally, "fathers of secrets") and regard them as both the guardians of the Ifá text and the custodians of all paraphernalia of Ifá divination. The babaláwo, therefore, runs "errand" for Ifá by deciphering the coded message from the latter and making it intelligible to the client.
Perhaps the name babaláwo as "fathers of secrets" lends more credence to the assertion that "philosophic thought in traditional Africa seems to have developed a protective tendency" (Eze 1998, 174) . The name also explains why a non-initiate may not make meaning of or decipher an odù signature. The awesome disposition of the babaláwo to interpret an Odù signature is held by many to be the result of the mandatory several years training. In the context of Yorùbá (African) philosophy, therefore, the babaláwo qualify as priests of sagacious intellect whose wealth of knowledge is of both mundane and esoteric significance. Unfortunately, this point has served as a basis for many people to assume that old age plays a significant role in the Ifá system and, by extension, in what passes muster as "philosophical" in Africa. Crucial here is the assumption that the name babaláwo as "fathers of secrets" presupposes that a babaláwo is necessarily an elderly person and that the Ifá system encourages gerontocratic practices which may be a hindrance to what Hountondji coins as "polysemy of discourse" (Hountondji 1983, 179) .
The truth is that no babaláwo can recite or claim knowledge of all the two hundred and fifty-six Odù. Earlier scholarly works on Ifá by James Johnson (1899) and Stephen Farrow (1926) have shown why it would be difficult or impossible for a babaláwo to have knowledge of all the verses of Ifá. Both Johnson and Farrow are of the view that there is a possibility of a vast number of Odù emerging after each of the eight separate manipulations which are usually required. This means that we could have 4,096 Odù or a staggering 65,536 Odù. R. E. Dennett extracts how Johnson, for instance, arrived at the high numbers of Odù by pointing out that "there are 16 other Odus connected with each of the 256, and this makes the whole number of Odùs 4,096. Some increase this large number still by an addition of 16 more to each of the large number of Odùs" (Dennett 1906, 246) . Obviously, these numbers are more than any mnemonic genius can bear. William Bascom corroborates this point when he tells us that "the system permits no more and no less than 256 figures" (Bascom 1969, 42) . It is instructive to state here that there are legends or a series of traditional stories that are associated with Odù figures and "Each Odù is supposed to have 1,680 of these stories connected with it" (Dennett 1906, 247) . Thus, any researcher who is conversant with the system will know that he should not rule out the possibility of gaps in the rendition of the legends due to memory lapse or deficiency in the learning process. Since an aspiring babalàwo is expected to commit to memory a great number of these stories which may take him many years, some people have always insinuated that the office of a babalàwo necessarily suggests an elderly person. However, young men have been found to be good practitioners of Ifá system. 5 The foregoing only explains that old age has little or no significance in the rendition of the legends. Therefore, if a babaláwo is regarded as a man of sagacious intellect, he does not merit that compliment on the basis of his age but on the basis of his resourcefulness. This further explicates that Ifá system is not an impregnable precinct for young men who are diligent and have the zeal to memorize, recite and decipher the meaning of the verses of the corpus.
At this juncture, let us see the position of Ifá on the supposed manifestation of authoritarianism or gerontocratic practices in Yorùbá culture. Or, put in another way, let us examine the position of Ifá on the supposed traditional ill of authoritarianism which, in Wiredu's view, allows only the aged to occupy the "critical" sphere by stifling youthful initiative "to criticize, reject, modify or add to traditional philosophical ideas" (Wiredu 1980, 21) . The creative rendition of Òbàràbogbè, a verse of Ifá, is most instructive here. Òbàràbogbè says:
Ọwọ ọmọdé ò tó pẹpẹ Tàgbà ò wọ kèègbè A díá fún tẹgbọn tàbúrò Nijọ tí wọn ń loko Ejí…
6
The hand of a child cannot reach the shelf Nor can the hand of the adult enter a gourd Thus divination was undertaken for two brothers On their way to seek refuge in Ejí … According to the above verse of Òbàràbogbè, there lived two brothers in the distant past; the elder brother was actually old enough to be the younger brother's father and was playing the role of a father after the demise of their parents. One season, an unfortunate pestilence came and tore their town apart, leaving many people dead. As many people were fleeing to far-off towns, the elder brother decided that they seek refuge in Ejí, a very long distance away from their own town. They fared for days, living on whatever edible they could find in the thick jungle. But when Ejí was only a two-day journey away, they could not find anything to eat again and were pale with hunger; the younger brother was now so visibly emaciated that the elder brother had to carry him on the shoulder. At last, they approached Ejí and stumbled on a big farm of corn.
The brothers decided to spend a night by the farm and have a corn meal. As the elder brother made to enter the farm to gather some corn for their meal, he was intercepted by an Eji native who was passing by. The native told him that it was a taboo to "steal" from someone else's farm. The native did not hesitate to tell the two brothers that they would be killed if they were caught stealing from someone else's farm. The native soon left the brothers in their pitiable condition and without offering them something to eat. The brothers lay by the farmland throughout the night suppressing the urge to enter the farm and get some corn for their meal. At one point, the elder brother could no longer bear to see his younger brother suffer and, so, decided to enter the farm. As he made to enter the farm, his younger brother stopped him and explained that he had come up with an idea.
The younger brother instructed the elder brother to carry him on the shoulder as he did during their long journey. The latter obeyed, curious and impatient to know what his brother was up to. Now sitting comfortably on the elder brother's shoulder, the younger brother gave another instruction that the elder brother enter the farm, warning the latter not to touch anything once they were in the farm. The younger brother then began to rip off the corn from their ears, one after the other, until he had fetched enough. He gathered the corn in his tunic and ordered his brother out of the farm. Outside the farm, they found a glade, gathered wood and made a fire, whereupon they ate to their fill. Not long afterwards, two armed men pounced on them, accused them of theft and led them to the king's palace in the heart of Ejí town.
The elder brother was visibly shaken by the horror of death when they were finally brought before the king's court, remembering in great despair what an Ejí native had told them the previous day. In order to win the king's sympathy he broke into tears. He was about to confess their sin when the younger brother, to the surprise of the elder brother and the king's council, stepped forward and claimed that they were not guilty of the crime. He insisted that they did not steal from the farm and that they were ready to swear or take oath before the people's òrìsà or tribal god. The king granted the younger brother's request and ordered that the accused be led to swear before the people's òrìsà who had never spared the guilty ones. As two armed men led them towards the grove of the òrìsà, a mammoth crowd behind them, the younger brother taught the elder brother how exactly he should swear at the grove. Thus, before the òrìsà, the two brothers swore one after the other:
"If with my legs I stepped into the farm for which I am accused, òrìsà, come quickly and take my life!" swore the younger brother and, to the surprise of the gathering, he came out of the grove alive. "If with my hands I stole corn from the farm for which I am accused, òrìsà, come quickly and take my life!" the elder brother swore and also came out of the grove alive.
After this incident, the king ordered that the brothers be released. He tendered an apology on behalf of his people and, as compensation, gave the two brothers a piece of land to cultivate. Thereafter, the two brothers lived in Ejí and taught friends and neighbours that wisdom is not the exclusive property of the old alone.
Apart from the lesson from the above narrative and certain Yorùbá proverbs (some of which Owomoyela has given us) concerning how the Yorùbá idea of gerontocracy allows the individual to express himself in society, there is across the whole spectrum of Yorubá thought the prominence of the idea that individual gerontocracy in Africa does not deny epistemological authority to the young. A good example can be recorded in the ways the Yorubá approach the issue of Orí or the problem of destiny.
Orí represents the symbol and the bearer of human destiny. Literally, Orí is the physical head which houses the brain and also designates the seat of the intellect. It is regarded by some authors as a visible representation of another head called orí-inú, literally, "the inner head". The Yoruba believe that the orí-inú "rules, controls and guides the life activities of the person" (Idowu 1962, 170) . Thus, orí-inú is regarded as the essence of human personality. It is held to provide for the individual the essential things of life and serve as the guiding "counterpart" through the vicissitudes of daily life. It is also popularly held to be the determinant of the fate of the individual. Segun Gbadegesin puts the foregoing more succinctly:
Orí is, as it were, the "case" in which individual destiny is wound up. Each… created being picks up his/her own … "case" without knowing what is stored there. But whatever is stored therein will determine the life course of the individual in this world (Gbadegesin 1998, 155) .
Adegboyega Orangun (1998, 139) delves into the Yorubá contextual scheme and opines that three major schools of thought on Orí or destiny can be identified, namely, the Absolute school, the Liberal school and the Empiricist school. The absolute or orthodox school holds that, once an individual chooses good or bad Orí in the spiritual world, the possibility of altering his primordial choice is out of place. The position of this school is supported by a verse of Òsá Méjì thus:
Bí ó bá se pé gbogbo orí gbogbo ní í sun pósí, Ìrókò gbogbo ìbá ti tán n'ígbó. A díá fún igba ẹni, Tí n t'Ikọle ọrun bọ wá sí t'ayé. Bí ó bá se pé gbogbo orí gbogbo ní í sun pósí, Ìrókò gbogbo ìbá ti tán n'ígbó. A díá fún Òwèrè, Tí n t'Ikọle ọrun bọ wá sí t'ayé. Òwèrè là n jà, Gbogboo wa. Òwèrè là n jà. Ẹni t'ó yan'rí rere kò wọpọ. Òwèrè là n jà, Gbogboo wa. Òwèrè là n jà (Abimbola 1976, 146-147) .
If all men were destined to be buried in coffins, All iroko trees would have been exhausted in the forest. Ifa divination was performed for two hundred men Who were coming from heaven to earth. If all men were destined to be buried with coffins, All iroko trees would have been exhausted in the forest. Ifa divination was also performed for Struggle Who was coming from heaven to earth. We are only struggling. All of us. We are only struggling. Those who chose good destinies are not many. We are only struggling. All of us. We are only struggling.
Examined closely, this school of thought is of the view that nothing-be it a sacrifice to a god, importunity to even Olódùmare, the Supreme Being-can rectify a bad Orí or guarantee a good Orí once a bad one has been chosen in the spiritual world. Thus, the absolute school is obviously advocating some sort of fatalism. However, a verse of Ọyẹku Méjì conveys the idea that the absolutist position on Orí is untenable. The verse reads:
…Njẹ owó ló bá nwù mí ò, Mo wí; Èjì Ọyẹ Ifá ní ó yẹre tèmi fémi Aya ló bá nwù mí ò, Mo wí; Èjì Ọyẹ, Ifá ní ó yẹre tèmi fémi. Ilé ló bá nwù mí ò Mo wí; Èjì Ọyẹ Ifá ní ó yẹre tèmi fémi Gbogbo ire t ó bá nwù mí ò, Mo wí; Èjì Ọyẹ, Ifá ní ó yẹre tèmi fémi (Abimbola 1968, 32-33) The above excerpt emphasizes human freedom which allows the individual to consult Ifá or observe certain rituals in order to improve his lots or alter his destiny (usually from bad to good). It is common knowledge among the Yoruba that Ifá priests often prescribe for their clients certain ẹbọ (religious sacrifice) and the need to imbibe good character (iwapẹlẹ) to rectify bad Orí or attract good Orí if a bad Orí has been chosen in the spiritual world. Against the fatalistic interpretation of Orí rendered in Òsá Méjì, therefore, Ọyẹku Méjì brings new perspective to the issue by drawing our attention to the importance of ẹbọ (religious sacrifice) and iwapẹlẹ (good character) and suggesting these as panacea against bad Orí. The foregoing reflects the liberal approach to destiny.
The liberal school thus sees the choice of Orí as merely a potentiality. It questions the fatalistic stance of the absolutist school and puts a premium on "the dynamic nature of life and its changing pattern brought about by the human intellect, will and freedom and efforts which God permits" (Ogunmodede 2001 (Ogunmodede -2002 . The view of the liberal school on Orí is summarized thus:
The choice of good orí is neither a necessary corollary to success nor the choice of bad orí an absolute condemnation to failure in life… success or failure in life depends to a large extent on human efforts, struggle and hardwork (Orangun 1998, 133) .
We can point out here that this school of thought encourages man to find means of improving upon his condition. In other words, man is not expected to resign to fate; rather he is expected to examine himself, find out why things are the way they are and use his own human intellect to change the unseemly course of events. He is also expected to be cautious and observe certain taboos. The basic thesis of this school is found in Otuurupọn Méjì which runs thus:
Ọpẹbẹ, awo Ẹsẹ; Ló díá f Ẹsẹ Nijọ tí n tikọle ọrun bọ wáyé. Gbogbo àwọn orí sa ara jọ, Nwọn ò pe Ẹsẹ sí i. Èsù ní ẹ ò pe Ẹsẹ sí i, Bí ó ti se gún náà nù un. Ìjà ni nwọn fi túká mbẹ. Ni nwọn tóó wáá rannsẹ sí Ẹsẹ Nígbà náà ni imọran tí nw̩ ọn ngbàá tóó wáá gún. Nwọn ní bẹẹ gẹgẹ Ni àwọn awo wọn wí: Ọpẹbẹ, awo Ẹsẹ Ló díá f Ẹsẹ Nijọ tí n tikọle ọrun bọ wáyé. Ọpẹbẹ mọ mọ dé ò, Awo Ẹsẹ. Ẹnìkan kìí gbimọran Kó yọ tẹsẹẹ 'lẹ. Ọpẹbẹ mọ mọ dé ò, Awo Ẹsẹ (Abimbola 1968, 130-131) .
Wande Abimbola (1976, 149) The above excerpt emphasizes the fact that the individual's success or failure in life does not depend on his choice of Orí alone, but also on his personal efforts. According to Abimbola:
The … excerpt tells the story of the day all heads gathered themselves together to deliberate on something which they wanted to bring to fruition. They did no invite Ẹsẹ (Legs) to the meeting. After all their deliberations, they discovered that there was nobody to carry them about to execute their plans. They were therefore forced to recognize the importance of Ẹsẹ in the execution of their plans. Ẹsẹ is here used as the symbol of power and activity while Orí (Head) is the symbol of predestined success. The point of the story is that even if one is predestined to success by the choice of a good Orí, one cannot actually achieve success without the use of one's Ẹsẹ, the symbol of activity and power (Abimbola 1976, 148) .
The position held by the votaries of the liberal school is further corroborated by such Ifá verses 7 as Ọyẹku Méjì and Ìká Méjì. The third school of thought proposed by Orangun is the empiricist school. This lays much emphasis on the physical than the spiritual aspect of man. It claims that there is no Orí which is essentially bad and that only good or bad character determines one's success or failure in life. That good character determines one's success is aptly expressed by an Ifá verse thus:
Ẹ wá w'ọmọ Ìwà bẹrẹrẹ o Ẹ wá w'ọmọ Ìwà bẹrẹrẹ o Ìwà gbé dání Ìwà pòn s'éhìn Ẹ wá w' ọmọ ìwà bẹrẹrẹ (Idowu 1962,155) .
Come and behold the countless children of Ìwà Come and behold the countless children of Ìwà Ìwà carries (children) in her arms Ìwà carries (children) on her back Come and behold the countless children of Ìwà.
The above verse from Ogbè-'gúndá is informed by a story about Òrúnmìlà who at a time was unsuccessful in his endeavours. Divination was then undertaken for him and it was deciphered that he would be successful if he took Ìwà as his wife. Ọ̀ rúnmìlà obeyed the divine counsel and became very successful thereafter. From the standpoint of the empiricist school, a verse of Òtúúrupọǹ Méjì also conveys the impression that Orí is not relevant in the assessment of either the success or failure of the individual. What is important in such an assessment is Ìwá (the character of the individual) or the influence of other people on him (Idowu 1962, 155) . The verse says:
Ọgbọń jọjọ níí sọnií diwín; Bóògùn bá pọ̀ lápọjù A sọ ni di wèrè; Bóbìnrín bá gbọń ní àgbọńjù Pénpé lasọ ọkọ rẹẹ mọ (Abimbola 1968, 131) .
Excess craftiness leads one to lunacy; Excess possession of charms Turns one to a lunatic; A cunning woman Brings misfortune to her husband… This verse expresses the fact that a man may become poor or suffer some other misfortune if his wife is cunning or unfaithful, thereby emphasizing that the influence of other people on us is crucial in the assessment of destiny.
The Ifá verses examined on the conceptual problem of Orí or destiny qualify as a glowing reportage against the modernist idea that gerontocracy in Africa does not guarantee the ability to look at issues from different points of view. The foregoing thus casts doubt on the assertion by Hountondji (1983, 179 ) that traditional African thought is not subject to a "polysemy of discourse".
Mostly regarded as the religious text of the Yoruba, Ifá is an embodiment of knowledge and wisdom that qualifies as Yorubá philosophy. Through the exposure of certain recondite elements of philosophic value in Ifá, we have shown in this study that gerontocracy in Africa does not stifle youthful initiative to participate in the critical sphere. Thus, the idea of gerontocracy in Africa is not coterminous with what Wiredu calls the "authoritarian odour" in African culture; rather, gerontocracy in Africa evokes the ability to look at issues from several angles, encourages thinkers (young or/and old) to explore different views and bring new perspectives. Examined closely, therefore, we can conclude that the position of the modernists on the supposed manifestation of authoritarianism in Africa derives its continuing force from a conception of philosophy, which gives special overtones to the ideas of individuals as opposed to a collectivistic system of thought and the assumption that the multitude cannot produce philosophy.
